into Article 6 TEU. 16 Thus, the Charter became the EU's bill of rights, albeit through the kitchen door, on 1 December 2009 . 17 Yet, the drafters of both the Constitution and subsequently of the Treaty of Lisbon, agreed it was also fitting to provide for accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. This is where the journey to Opinion 2/13 began. From the start it was rather obvious that the accession to ECHR would not be smooth by any stretch of the imagination. Quite to the contrary, ups and downs where in the cards from the start. 18 The legal basis for the accession to the ECHR is laid down in Article 6(2) TEU. 19 The first thing that stands out is the language employed by the Treaty drafters. The provision in question provides that the EU "shall accede" to ECHR, which may give an impression that the European Union is under an obligation to do so. This is rather intriguing and may lead to divergent opinions. At best, it is lex imperfecta. 20 It is well known that for a country or the EU to accede to the ECHR approval of non-EU contracting parties to the ECHR is necessary. 21 Therefore, if one were to interpret Article 6 TEU as an obligation to accede, one would have to admit that the obligation was only on the EU to seek accession. Interestingly enough, this had been exactly the wording of Article 7(2) of the Draft Constitution for Europe, which served as a point of departure for the contemporary Article 6 TEU. 21 A brief reminder is fitting that originally the ECHR had been opened to participation of states only. However, Protocol No 14 to ECHR provides now for a possibility of EU's accession. 22 Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ C 169/2003, p. 1. It should be noted, however, that Article I-9 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, which was signed a year later, provided for a straightforward obligation to accede (OJ C 310/2004, p. 1).
Of crucial importance are several caveats laid down in Article 6(2) TEU as well as in a tailormade Protocol 8 to the Founding Treaties. 23 Furthermore, one should not leave aside a Declaration which is, too, annexed to the Founding Treaties. Because these caveats are of crucial importance for Opinion 2/13 and its analysis that follows later in this article it is pivotal at this stage to evaluate them in more detail.
To begin with, Article 6(2) TEU provides that the accession to the ECHR "shall not affect the Union's competences as defined in the Treaties." This is not surprising, bearing in mind how much attention the Member States pay to the doctrine of attributed powers that underpins the EU legal order. Article 1 of Protocol No 8 clarifies further that the Accession Agreement shall "make provision for preserving the specific characteristics of the Union and Union law." This, in particular, should include a modus operandi for division of liability for breaches of the ECHR between the EU and its Member States. Article 2 of the Protocol emphasizes again that the accession shall neither affect competences of the EU nor powers of its institutions. This repetition of a norm stemming anyhow from Article 6(2) TEU may be perceived as a sign of desperation of the Member States as if having such a caveat repeated twice in different parts of the Treaties were to strengthen its force. Article 2 of the Protocol further clarifies that accession to the ECHR does not affect: the situation of Member States in relation to the European Convention, in particular in relation to the Protocols thereto, measures taken by Member States derogating from the European Convention in accordance with Article 15 thereof and reservations to the European Convention made by Member States in accordance with Article 57 thereof. 23 Protocol 8 provides: Article 1: "The agreement relating to the accession of the Union to the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as the 'European Convention') provided for in Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union shall make provision for preserving the specific characteristics of the Union and Union law, in particular with regard to: (a) the specific arrangements for the Union's possible participation in the control bodies of the European Convention; (b) the mechanisms necessary to ensure that proceedings by non-Member States and individual applications are correctly addressed to Member States and/or the Union as appropriate. " Bearing in mind all those caveats the European Union started the preparatory work on negotiations soon after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. They were completed on 5 April 2013 when the negotiations of the Draft Accession Agreement and associated instruments were approved. 24 Following that the European Commission requested opinion of the Court of Justice, as per Article 218(11) TFEU, on the compatibility with the Treaties of the Draft Accession Agreement.
II. Silence Speaks Louder than Words? The Court of Justice and Division of Competences Between the EU and Member States après Accession to the ECHR
Opinion 2/13 is prima facie rather long, but this in itself does not translate into robustness and completeness of the analysis conducted by the Court of Justice. As a matter of fact, large parts of the Opinion are limited to a descriptive overview of the ECHR, the Draft Accession Agreement as well as positions of the European Commission and the Member States-a majority of which submitted written and oral observations during the Court proceedings. 25 As far as the substance is concerned, the center of gravity in the Court's analysis is, not surprisingly, on the caveats laid down in Article 6 TEU and Protocol No 8. Further, what may take some by surprise, is the fact that the judges focused only on some but not all of them. Indeed, in sections of the Opinion devoted to the substance, the judges swiftly moved to matters pertinent to autonomy of EU law, which, without a shadow of the doubt, are close to the Court's heart. Often the judges at Kirchberg made that point clear in the past and they equally do so in Opinion 2/13. This is discussed further below, but before this analysis addresses the autonomy of EU law it is interesting to delve deeper into what the judges left largely aside. This is particularly fitting as the Court of Justice skimmed though a matter that is of highest importance for the Member States. One of the desires of drafters of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, and subsequently the Treaty of Lisbon, was to have a transparent delimitation of competences between the Member States and the European Union. This materialized in Articles 2-6 TFEU and, as mentioned above, for the purposes of accession to the ECHR in the already mentioned Article 6(2) TEU and Article 2 of Protocol 8. Both provide unequivocally that participation of the EU in the ECHR framework should not affect in any way the competences of the European Union. The Member States had no intention of allowing the accession to the ECHR to serve as a kitchen door vehicle for increasing the of powers of the European Union. In her View the Advocate General Kokott engaged thoroughly in the analysis of the matter at hand to reach a conclusion that the Draft Accession Agreement in its current form does not change the competences transferred to the EU by its Member States. 26 As already alluded to, the Court of Justice has largely stayed silent in this respect and focused on it only in the context of Article 344 TFEU and the co-respondent mechanism.
27 Some key issues analysed by the Advocate General Kokott are not touched upon at all, for instance, whether as a result of accession to the ECHR competences of the EU curtail, extend or a transfer of further competences from the Member States to the EU is required. The question is how this should be interpreted.
Again, it is worthwhile to emphasize that the deliberations are conducted behind the closed doors, which leaves a lot to commentators' imaginations. The arguments that follow may contain some seeds of truth or they may amount only to pure speculation. Still, even if only for the purposes of intellectual exercise, it is worth drawing a couple of scenarios. One option is to assume that the Court of Justice used a decision to focus on faults of the Draft Accession Agreement, not on its strengths. It may well be that the judges implicitly followed the Advocate General Kokott and assumed that division of competences between the EU and its Member States, following accession to the ECHR, would be largely a nonissue that would raise hardly any doubts sans one specific matter: Compatibility of the Draft Accession Agreement with Article 344 TFEU. The other option is that the Court of Justice assumed that because the Member States were ready to sign the Draft Accession Agreement and the Advocate General Kokott raised no doubts, it implied their approval to any consequences for the division of competences. Bearing that in mind the judges focused, as already argued, on their own priorities. Either way, it leaves one disappointed that the Court does not robustly address such a fundamental issue, even if it were to clear the ECHR accession in this respect.
III. Autonomy of EU Law Revisited
The reasoning of the Court starts with a number of preliminary points focusing on the idiosyncratic nature of the European Union and its legal order. Although the Court of Justice states the obvious, the judges found it appropriate to underline some fundamentals. Interestingly, the Court openly confirms that the European Union is not a State, yet at the same time emphasizes that the Treaties forming its legal foundation created "a new legal order," the main characteristics of which are the doctrines of primacy 26 See paras. 33-55 of the View of Advocate General Kokott. 27 See infra Sections IV and V. and direct effect. 28 According to the judges, it is precisely the EU legal order that "has consequences as regards the procedure for and conditions of accession to the ECHR."
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The Court then adds that "essential characteristics of EU law have given rise to a structured network of principles, rules and mutually interdependent legal relations linking the EU and its Member States, and its Member States with each other, which are now engaged . . . " in creation of the ever closer Union.
30
These proclamations are of fundamental importance for the analysis of the Court that follows. They serve as a point of departure for a series of powerful arguments that set the stage, or to put it differently, create a fortress EU. It seems as if the Court wishes to convey: This is our point of departure; this is where we stand. The judges are fully aware of the possibility that their rejection of the Draft Accession Agreement may be met with fierce criticism and accusations that the Court of Justice does not take fundamental rights seriously. 31 This may explain why in paragraphs 169 through 177 the judges elaborate on the position of fundamental rights in the EU legal order, as well as the importance and status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. As if to counterattack that alluded criticism, the Court of Justice argues that " […] at the heart of that legal structure [ One of them is application and respect for EU law, which is supported by the Court of Justice and the national courts, whose task is to "ensure the full application of EU law in all Member States and to ensure judicial protection of an individual's rights under that law." 40 Not surprisingly, the Court of Justice emphasizes the importance of the preliminary ruling procedure in this respect. 41 As stressed by the Court, the autonomy that EU law receives vis-à-vis national laws of the Member States, as well as public international law, must be ensured. 42 With that in mind, the Court of Justice in paragraph 178 of the opinion outlines the remit of its analysis. 43 First, it checks if the Draft Accession Agreement is "liable adversely to affect the specific characteristics of EU law," in particular "the autonomy of EU law in interpretation and application of fundamental rights, as recognised by EU law and notably by the Charter." Second, the judges express a desire to verify that institutional modi operandi provided for in the Draft Accession Agreement comply with all caveats listed in Article 6(2) TEU and Protocol No 8.
The evaluation of the Draft Accession Agreement starts here with three loud salvos. To begin with, the Court of Justice, rightly so, states that accession to ECHR would make the 37 46 This leads to a very interesting point regarding a potential judicial competition between the two Courts, particularly in relation to interpretation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Court of Justice unequivocally fortifies itself and argues that its counterpart in Strasbourg should not have the jurisdiction to challenge its findings as to the scope of EU law, which is crucial for determination if the Member States are bound by the EU's fundamental rights. 47 To put it differently, the Court of Justice will only clear the accession to the ECHR if it is guaranteed exclusive competence to determine whether EU law, particularly the Charter of Fundamental Rights, applies and whether a particular case falls within the remit of the ECHR.
As widely known, the Charter of Fundamental Rights is largely based on the ECHR. 48 On the one hand, these provisions of the Charter which replicate the ECHR should be interpreted 44 Para. 183 of the Opinion. 45 Para 184 of the Opinion. taking into account the ECHR and case law of the Strasbourg Court. 49 On the other hand, the Court of Justice arguably wishes to be the master of the game and to have the final word in interpreting the Charter. This, in the Court's view, is a consequence of " [t] he fact that the EU has a new kind of legal order, the nature of which is peculiar to the EU, its own constitutional framework and founding principles, a particularly sophisticated institutional structure and a full set of legal rules to ensure its operation." This supports the argument set forth in this article's introduction that one of the aims of the Court may have been to delay the accession to the ECHR in order to build sufficient case law on the Charter of Fundamental Rights and not be directly exposed to the Strasbourg Court's case law. The less-developed the Charter is, the more its interpretation would be influenced by Strasbourg rulings.
The Court's motives are even clearer in paragraphs 187 through 189, where it elaborates on contentious Article 53 of the Charter. 50 Quite controversially, the Court of Justice in Melloni ruled that the provision in question should be interpreted in the following manner: "[T]he application of national standards of protection of fundamental rights must not compromise the level of protection provided for by the Charter or the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law." 51 This interpretation, however, does not sit comfortably with Article 53 of the ECHR. The latter allows the parties to the Convention to provide higher standards in their national laws than those of the Convention. Arguably, this could lead to a clash of titans. The Member States would be allowed to have higher standards as per ECHR but not as per the Charter of Fundamental Rights. This, in the eyes of the Court of Justice, would potentially affect the primacy, unity, and effectiveness of EU law. Bearing this in mind, the Court of Justice makes in paragraph 189 a demand for a special arrangement. 52 According to the judges, it is necessary to limit the powers of the Member States of the European Union under Article 53 ECHR so that the higher standards of fundamental rights protection can only be provided in national law in the areas where EU law does not apply. 53 In the latter scenario, Article 53 ECHR would apply without restrictions. Although the Court of Justice diplomatically refers to a need for 49 52 Para 189 of the Opinion: "In so far as Article 53 of the ECHR essentially reserves the power of the Contracting Parties to lay down higher standards of protection of fundamental rights than those guaranteed by the ECHR, that provision should be coordinated with Article 53 of the Charter, as interpreted by the Court of Justice, so that the power granted to Member States by Article 53 of the ECHR is limited -with respect to the rights recognised by the Charter that correspond to those guaranteed by the ECHR -to that which is necessary to ensure that the level of protection provided for by the Charter and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not compromised.". 53 Ibidem.
"coordination" between Article 53 ECHR and Article 53 of the Charter, this essentially amounts to a request for an opt-out. Arguably, this issue will be one of the most difficult to deal with when re-negotiations of the Draft Accession Agreement commence. Needless to say, this would affect one of the pillars on which the ECHR is based and will most likely raise controversies.
Creation of this major lock takes the Court of Justice back to the raison d'être behind its ruling in the Melloni case. In Melloni, the Court endeavored to balance fundamental rights and the principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters. As well-known, that principle is a cornerstone of the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice, including its flagship instrument the Council Framework Decision 584/2002/JHA on the European Arrest Warrant.
54 It provides for a fast track, court-to-court procedure for surrender of individuals for the purposes of prosecution or execution of sentences.
55 Following a revision of this Framework Decision in 2009, the power of national courts to refuse surrender is reduced, as far as perpetrators sentenced in absentia are concerned, only to cases when the accused was genuinely not aware of criminal proceedings pending against her or him in another Member State. 56 This, however, did not entirely mesh with the Spanish Constitution's fundamental rights standard. Therefore, the Court of Justice was asked to determine which system should prevail. The judges famously ruled that the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant is compatible with the EU's fundamental rights standards, and furthermore, that both the Framework Decision and the Charter of Fundamental Rights benefited from the doctrine of primacy over the Spanish Constitution. Had the latter been followed, it would have undermined the effectiveness of EU law, particularly the Council Framework Decision 584/2002/JHA on the European Arrest Warrant.
This issue arose again in Opinion 2/13, where the Court of Justice turned to the principle of mutual trust, the basis and a prerequisite for mutual recognition. According to the Court, the fact that accession to the ECHR would also allow application of this Convention between the EU Member States when they act within the sphere of EU law could undermine the mutual trust by requiring the authorities to check compliance with fundamental rights by fellow Member States. From the perspective of the Court of Justice, it is "liable to upset the underlying balance of the EU and undermine the autonomy of EU law." 57 This is the second major lock developed by the Court of Justice, and the question of its interpretation remains. A narrow reading of paragraph 194 of the opinion implies that a tailor-made rule must be developed to exempt application of the ECHR between the Member States when mutual recognition instruments are at stake. 58 Although the Court focuses strictly on criminal matters, the principle of mutual recognition based on mutual trust also applies in other areas falling under the umbrella of Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice. One must remember, however, that the principle of mutual recognition has its limits, and compliance with fundamental rights standards by the Member States is not fait accompli. The Court's own judgment in case N.S. speaks for itself. 59 A broad reading of paragraph 194 of the opinion may indicate that the Court demands non-application of the ECHR between the EU Member States when their relations are governed by EU law. Either way, negotiators must also address this issue when they revise the mandate for accession talks and eventually attempt to re-negotiate the Draft Accession Agreement.
The third major objection made by the Court of Justice relates to ECHR Protocol 16, which provides for a modus operandi allowing national courts of ECHR parties to send requests for advisory opinions to the European Court of Human Rights. 60 Interestingly, neither did Protocol 16 enter into force, nor did the European Union become a party to it. However, the Court of Justice opts for an ex ante attack, predicting a potential threat to the autonomy of EU law, particularly to the already mentioned preliminary ruling procedure based on Article 267 TFEU. The Court of Justice openly considers the lack of a provision determining the relationship between the two procedures as something that "is liable adversely to affect the autonomy and effectiveness" of the preliminary ruling. 61 Alas, the judges fail to specify what this lock amounts to and what kind of a solution would satisfy the Court. The extreme, although very likely, expectation is a proviso explicitly excluding the availability of Protocol 16 modus operandi when EU law applies to a domestic case at hand. Any softer mechanism may not meet the Court's expectations when (and if) it is asked again to clear the way for the EU's accession to the ECHR. 57 Para. 194 of the Opinion: "In so far as the ECHR would, in requiring the EU and the Member States to be considered Contracting Parties not only in their relations with Contracting Parties which are not Member States of the EU but also in their relations with each other, including where such relations are governed by EU law, require a Member State to check that another Member State has observed fundamental rights, even though EU law imposes an obligation of mutual trust between those Member States, accession is liable to upset the underlying balance of the EU and undermine the autonomy of EU law." On foregoing three grounds, the Court of Justice held in its interim conclusion that the accession would "adversely . . . affect the specific characteristics of EU law and its autonomy." 62 
IV. Article 344 TFEU
The Court next addresses the compatibility of the Draft Accession Treaty with Article 344 TFEU, which provides: "Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those provided for therein." The Court has consistently used this provision to claim its exclusive jurisdiction whenever the interpretation or application of EU law is at stake. 63 As previously explained, Article 6(2) TEU clearly states that the accession shall not affect the Union's competences as defined in the Treaties. Furthermore, Article 3 of Protocol 8 confirms that nothing in the Agreement shall affect Article 344 TFEU. Therefore, this issue was clearly on the table from the outset. 64 Yet, Article 344 TFEU merely refers to Member States submitting a dispute. In that respect, the Commission argues that disputes between the Member States in the context of the ECHR would involve interpretation or application of the ECHR, rather than the EU Treaties. 65 Obviously in cases where the content of ECHR and EU provisions is similar, Article 344 TFEU could be infringed. 66 Therefore, a special provision on the inadmissibility of those disputes would not be necessary. This view was shared by Greece, but not by France, which argued that it must still remain possible for a Member State to appear as a third-party intervener in support of one or more of its nationals in a case against another Member State that is brought before the ECtHR, even where that other Member State is acting in the context of implementation of EU law. 67 As already mentioned, the Court devotes several paragraphs to its exclusive jurisdiction, the autonomy of EU law, the legal structure of the EU (including fundamental rights), the obligations of the Member States (for instance, on the basis of the principle of sincere cooperation), and the need for consistency and uniformity in the interpretation of EU law. 68 It concludes that "[f]undamental rights, as recognised in particular by the Charter, must therefore be interpreted and applied within the EU in accordance with [this] constitutional framework."
69 While this conclusion should not come as a surprise, given the fact that Article 344 TFEU was referred to in the Treaty (as well as in Protocols and Declarations), it remains difficult to square these starting points with the notion-which is at the heart of the Strasbourg system-that external judicial control is to be accepted once a violation of ECHR provisions is at stake. In fact, the two Courts have debated this issue during the accession process. 70 For instance, in a joint communication from Presidents Costa and Skouris (24 January 2011), the parties recognized that "[a]s a result of that accession, the acts of the EU will be subject, like those of the other High Contracting Parties, to the review exercised by the ECtHR in the light of the rights guaranteed under the Convention." 71 The Presidents pointed to two situations: First, direct actions, in which case the CJEU would have a chance to rule; and second, cases on EU law application/interpretation before domestic courts, where in the absence of a preliminary question, the CJEU would not be in a position to review the consistency of that law with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights. While the Presidents argued that such a "situation should not arise often," they nevertheless proposed "a procedure . . . , in connection with the accession of the EU to the Convention, which is flexible and would ensure that the CJEU may carry out an internal review before the ECHR carries out external review."
72 They found in a solution in a prior involvement procedure, laid down in Article 3(6) of the Draft Accession Agreement. Ironically, this procedure is also under attack in the Court's Opinion. 73 It is notable that the CJEU previously pointed to these issues during earlier stages. In a 2010 discussion document it argued that "the Union must make sure . . . that external 72 Ibidem. 73 See infra Section VI.
review by the Convention institutions can be preceded by effective internal review by the courts of the Member States and/or of the Union." 74 The Court added that:
[t]o maintain uniformity in the application of European Union law and to guarantee the necessary coherence of the Union's system of judicial protection, it is therefore for the Court of Justice alone, in an appropriate case, to declare an act of the Union invalid. . . . In order to preserve this characteristic of the Union's system of judicial protection, the possibility must be avoided of the European Court of Human Rights being called on to decide on the conformity of an act of the Union with the Convention without the Court of Justice first having had an opportunity to give a definitive ruling on the point.
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Hence, the Court has been quite consistent in pointing out some of the consequences of Article 344 TFEU. Yet the interpretation of this provision now seems to affect the very idea of joining the ECHR. As argued above, for all other parties to the Convention, being bound by the fundamental rights in the ECHR in the exercise of their internal powers is the very essence of joining the system in the first place. While the Court seems to acknowledge this in paragraph 185 of the opinion, it nevertheless maintains that "it should not be possible for the ECHR to call into question the Court's findings in relation to the scope ratione materiae of EU law, for the purposes, in particular, of determining whether a Member State is bound by fundamental rights of the EU."
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One particular problem in this respect is related to Article 55 of the ECHR, which, in a way, is the counterpart of Article 344 TFEU. It reads:
The High Contracting Parties agree that, except by special agreement, they will not avail themselves of treaties, conventions or declarations in force between them for the purpose of submitting, by way of petition, a dispute arising out of the interpretation or application 74 79 In other words-as noted by the Advocate General Kokott-a rule would be needed by which Article 344 TFEU would be unaffected by, and take precedence over, Article 33 ECHR (implying inadmissibility of a claim in a case that would nevertheless be initiated). The problem therefore flows from the risk that the application and interpretation of internal EU law (in disputes between Member States inter se or between Member States and the Union) will be by-passed. Though, one must also consider the extent of this risk. Member States are well aware of the Court's case law on this point, and the issue could perhaps be solved on the basis of so-called disconnection declarations.
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V. The Co-Respondent Mechanism
While the Court emphasizes that the EU is not a state-a fact, but nevertheless a novum 82 -and that the special characteristics of the EU have not been taken into account, one cannot maintain that there has been no discussion. In fact, the special situation of the accession of an organization with a complex division of competences was at the heart of the debates over the past years. 83 This, for instance, led to the introduction of the so-called "co-respondent mechanism" to ensure that proceedings brought before the ECtHR by non- 81 The Advocate General Kokott mentioned the possibility used in Article 282 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (para. 115 of the View). Kuijper refers to the example of Annex 2 of the UNESCO Convention on cultural diversity, which states that the Member States of the Union which are party to the Convention (next to the EU itself) will apply the provisions of the agreement in question in their mutual relations in accordance with the Union's internal rules and without prejudice to appropriate amendments being made to these rules. P.J. Kuijper, 'Reaction to Leonard Besselink's ACELG Blog', 6 January 2015; http://acelg.blogactiv.eu/2015/01/06/reaction-to-leonard-besselinks's-acelg-blog/. 82 The discussion on this is well known and the most popular conclusory qualification still seems to be that the EU is a sui generis entity. The Court refers to this when it argues:
The fact that the EU has a new kind of legal order, the nature of which is peculiar to the EU, its own constitutional framework and founding principles, a particularly sophisticated institutional structure and a full set of legal rules to ensure its operation, has consequences as regards the procedure for and conditions of accession to the ECHR. G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l [Vol. 16 No. 01
EU-Member States and individual applications would be correctly addressed to Member States and/or the EU as appropriate.
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The co-respondent mechanism-laid down in Article 3 of the Draft Accession Agreementforesees the following possibility:
The European Union or a member State of the European Union may become a co-respondent to proceedings by decision of the Court in the circumstances set out in the Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. A co-respondent is a party to the case. The admissibility of an application shall be assessed without regard to the participation of a co-respondent in the proceedings.
This provision can be understood in the light of the complex, and dynamic, division of competences between the Union and its Member States. Yet, this mechanism also allows the ECtHR to implicitly decide on the division of competences between the EU and its Member States. In doing so, the ECtHR would have to interpret EU law, something that Court of Justice believes can only be done in Luxembourg. Admittedly, the Court of Justice makes a valid point. As we have seen, Article 344 of the TFEU aims to preserve the autonomy of the EU legal system and the Court is obliged to safeguard this principle. 85 And, as noted in Section B.I, Protocol No. 8 was created to explicitly address these issues.
The Court sees three problems. First, once the EU or Member States request leave to intervene as co-respondents in a case before the ECtHR, they must give reasons from which it can be established that the conditions for their participation in the procedure are met, and the ECtHR is to decide on that request in the light of the plausibility of those reasons. This will give the ECtHR the possibility of interfering with the division of powers between the EU and its Member States. Second, in the end, the EU and the Member States may be held jointly responsible. Yet, a Member State may have made a reservation in relation to the issue under review, which would imply a violation of Article 2 of EU Protocol No. 8, according to which the Accession Agreement must ensure that nothing therein affects the situation of Member States in relation to the ECHR. Third, in situations of joint responsibility, the ECHR may decide that only one of them is to be held responsible for that violation. Again, this would imply an assessment of the rules of EU law governing the division of powers between the EU and its Member States.
A first assessment of these arguments leads us to conclude that the Court may be overly cautious. This would not be the first time that a "foreign jurisdiction" has had an opinion on the division of competences and responsibilities between the EU and its Member States. The best example is provided by the WTO, where the division of competences is not even followed consistently as to fit the WTO's judicial framework best. And, in the end, the Union would even be able to argue-in line with the Kadi cases-that in the implementation it is bound by its own constitutional rules as long as it remains within the limits of its international obligations. More importantly, however, is that the argument seems flawed in principle. Shutting out a role of an external court whenever the interpretation of Union law is at stake could violate the very idea of the Strasbourg system. Joining that system implies some vulnerability as well as an acceptance of the fact that one will no longer by definition have the final say on interpretation of internal law in the light of obligations laid down in the Convention.
VI. Prior Involvement Procedure
One of the issues raised in the negotiations was the creation of a prior involvement procedure, allowing the Court of Justice to assess the compatibility of EU law with ECHR law before it is dealt with by the European Court of Human Rights in a case where the EU acts as a co-respondent and the Court of Justice has not had a prior opportunity to make such an assessment. 86 Article 3, paragraph 6 of the Draft Accession Agreement lays down the basic parameters of this procedure while further details are purely a matter of EU law for the European Union to regulate internally. This provision provides, inter alia, that such a procedure should facilitate a quick assessment to avoid further delays at the European Court of Human Rights and that the procedure will not affect the latter's powers. There is some controversy surrounding a decision regarding how to regulate such modus operandi and in which legal act. For instance, the European Commission-in its submission to the Court of Justice-argued that the prior involvement could be regulated in the Council Decision concluding the Accession Agreement as per Article 218(6)(a)(ii) of the TFEU. 87 The Dutch government argued in its pleadings, however, that for this purpose a revision of the Statute of the Court of Justice was more fitting. 88 Several governments that intervened in the Court proceedings agreed that the introduction of the prior involvement procedure 86 See further R. Baratta, op. cit. n. 20. 87 Para. 92 of the Opinion. 88 Para. 139 of the Opinion.
would confer additional powers on the Court of Justice, yet no prior amendment of the Founding Treaties would be necessary. 89 The prior involvement mechanism, as regulated in the Draft Accession Agreement, did not survive the Court's scrutiny on two grounds. To begin with, a conditio sine qua non for the Court of Justice is that the EU institution takes a decision if the Court of Justice has given a prior ruling on the matter in question. 90 Needless to say, this decision is crucial because it will trigger the prior involvement mechanism. According to the Court of Justice, such a decision should not belong to the European Court of Human Rights because it would cover-by its jurisdiction-interpretation of case law originating at Kirchberg in Luxembourg. 91 The second objection deals with the substance of such procedure. Article 3(6) of the Draft Accession Agreement employs a rather vague term: "[C]ompatibility with the Convention rights at issue of the provision of European Union law." The Draft Explanatory Note provides, however, a clarification. According to the note, the procedure would extend to the interpretation of primary law and the validity of secondary legislation. It is the latter point that raised the objections of both the Advocate General Kokott and the Court of Justice. While the Advocate General was willing to give a green light to the solution at hand-providing a clarification that the procedure would also cover interpretation of secondary legislation 92 -the Court of Justice dismissed outright the proposed arrangement. According to the judges, Article 3(6) of the Draft Accession Agreement-as interpreted in the Explanatory note-is also adversely affecting the competences of the European Union and the Court's powers. 93 
VII. Accession to the ECHR and Common Foreign and Security Policy
One specific argument used by the Court concerns the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), an area in which it has limited jurisdiction. By stating that "certain acts adopted in the context of the CFSP fall outside the ambit of judicial review by the Court of Justice," 94 the Court of Justice expresses its displeasure with the idea that the ECtHR would be able to rule on the compatibility with the ECHR of "certain acts, actions or omissions performed in the context of the CFSP." 95 competence to rule on CFSP issues has been widely debated over the years. 96 While there are clear limitations to the Court's jurisdiction, the Court correctly stated it is not the case that CFSP in its entirety would be immune to legal scrutiny. 97 Interestingly, it does not wish to give a final say on the scope of its jurisdiction. In particular, in relation to Article 275 TFEU-allowing for a review of the legality of decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons adopted by the Council on the basis of Chapter 2 of Title V of the EU Treaty-the Court keeps its options open: "[T]he Court has not yet had the opportunity to define the extent to which its jurisdiction is limited in CFSP matters as a result of those provisions." 98 Advocate General Kokott also referred to the issue when she argued that "accession to the ECHR will undoubtedly mean that the EU must respect the fundamental rights protection that stems from the ECHR-and thus also the requirement of effective legal protection in accordance with Articles 6 and 13 ECHR-in all its spheres of activity, including the CFSP." handling the options for the legal protection of individuals in the CFSP in such a way as to cover not only acts, within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, which produce binding legal effects, but also mere 'material acts' (Realakte), that is to say, acts without legal effects.
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While the Commission may be complemented for its daring view that in certain interpretations the extended jurisdiction of the Court indeed seems to flow from the new EU legal order that emerged after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 101 Advocate General Kokott is more careful and does not follow the Commission's interpretation. Perhaps even more interestingly, Kokott somewhat cryptically argued:
[T]he very wide interpretation of the jurisdiction of the Courts of the EU which it proposes is just not necessary for the purpose of ensuring effective legal protection for individuals in the CFSP. This is because the-entirely accurate-assertion that neither the Member States nor the EU institutions can avoid a review of the question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the Treaties as the basic constitutional charter does not necessarily always have to lead to the conclusion that the Courts of the EU have jurisdiction.
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The reason is that "national courts or tribunals have, and will retain, jurisdiction."
103 While we do not have reasons to deny this, the fact remains-as acknowledged by the Advocate General Kokott-that it is questionable whether the EU itself can provide effective legal protection in relation to CFSP. At least, the Court argued, "[A]s EU law now stands, certain acts adopted in the context of the CFSP fall outside the ambit of judicial review by the Court of Justice." 104 And it is this situation that provides the source of the Court's worries. It points to a possibility of not only extending judicial review to CFSP by using the (Strasbourg) back door, but also to the idea of the ECtHR being able to rule on the compatibility with the ECHR of acts in cases where it would itself have no powers. A "non-EU body" would, thus, have powers that were consciously left out of the EU Treaties for the CJEU itself. In its opinion, the Court now also aims to prevent other Courts from saying something on possible human rights violations-if I don't have the power, no-one else can have it. It is questionable whether this claim can be made.
The question is whether the choice of the EU Treaty negotiators to maintain a special position for many CFSP norms as far as their judicial review is concerned implies that possible human rights violations in relation to CFSP actions should in general be exempt from judicial scrutiny. Arguably, the reason for the special EU arrangement was to prevent judicial activism in this area of EU competence. Particularly in the early days, the idea was to keep CFSP apart from the "community method" and (certain) Member States were hesitant to allow the Court a position in which it would be able to develop CFSP in unwelcome directions. It is questionable whether the Court of Justice can legitimately claim exclusive jurisdiction in this area. While the Lisbon Treaty may indeed have put the exclusion of the Court in relation to CFSP into perspective, there are still clear shortcomings and allowing the Strasbourg system to fill some of those gaps would have been a welcome improvement. Also for some Member States, it is not at all uncommon to trust the ECHR to play a key role in constitutional protection.
C. Does the Court of Justice Take the Fundamental Rights Seriously?
I. Introduction
Having looked at the Opinion 2/13, it is fitting to analyze the consequences of the Court's ruling. There is no doubt, Opinion 2/13 triggers an existential question, quo vadis? In the short term, the Court of Justice blocked the accession of the European Union to the ECHR. The Court took a much stronger position than Advocate General Kokott, who recommended that the Court clears the accession subject to a number of conditions being met. The judges opted for a nuclear button instead. Opinion 2/13, and the locks laid down therein, are likely to put the Court of Justice on a collision course with the Member States that have invested a lot of efforts into making the accession to the ECHR a reality; not to mention, the other parties to the Convention, who have spent a lot of time and energy debating the special position of the Union. At the same time, it is not surprising to see the Court of Justice once again taking a bold step to protect its exclusive jurisdiction. Through the years it has become a tradition that when a different court appears to be on the horizon, the judges in Luxembourg eliminate the competition in advance. 109 For now, this means that the European Union will most likely ask everyone to come back to the drawing board and to re-open the negotiations of the Draft Accession Agreement. At the same time, the Court of Justice will be given a considerable amount of time to develop further its case law on the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Obviously, this is highly dependent on the direct actions submitted to the Court and the preliminary rulings which come from the national courts. Still however, cases touching upon the Charter are destined to reach the Luxembourg courtrooms sooner rather than later. This, as argued earlier, will allow the Court of Justice to give additional thrust to the Charter, on the one hand, and to prove that it is taking fundamental rights seriously, on the other. Both consequences of Opinion 2/13 are analyzed in turn.
II. Back to the Drawing Board? Options for Renegotiation of the Draft Accession Agreement
One thing that did not change with Opinion 2/13 is that the European Union remains under a self-imposed obligation to accede to the ECHR as per Article 6(2) TEU. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty it is no longer a choice. Obviously, Article 6(2) TEU does not mention a time frame, so theoretically the provision could be ignored for a long time and perhaps even indefinitely. The Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, would be the one to note the omission, however it would not only need to have the Member States on board, but it would also need to have a clear perspective on a possible way out. At the same time, EU institutions could be sued for a 'failure to act' as per Article 265 TFEU. Again however, while these options are legally interesting, they are most likely politically unrealistic.
While the possibility of solving certain points on the basis of interpretative declarations should not be excluded, it is questionable whether this will suffice to meet the Court's quite fundamental objections. It has been argued by Kuijper that "[i]t is not the text of the Accession Agreement itself that is contrary to the TFEU, but rather the use and the interpretation of the Agreement that the institutions and the Member Sates could make of the Agreement or the gaps that are left in it."
110 On the basis of a number of internal and external declarations and interpretations, a renegotiation could then be avoided. In Kuijper's view these declarations could, for instance, state that the Member States will not avail themselves of their right to go beyond the level of protection required by the ECHR; provided that could put the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law in danger. Similarly, disconnection declarations could make clear that in their internal (EU law related) disputes, the EU and its Member States will apply the ECHR in accordance with the Union's internal rules. Finally, in relation to the prior involvement procedure, the Member States could declare that the procedure would be used only exceptionally and under the strictest observance of the requirements of EU law. While Kuijper claims that these types of declarations should constitute sufficient guarantee for the Court, one may wonder whether this is the case, given the quite fundamental nature of some of the Court's objections. In a way, elements of these solutions were also present in the View of the Advocate General Kokott, which obviously did not convince the Court. At the same time, it is questionable whether for instance disconnection declarations would be acceptable to the non-EU parties to the Convention. Such declarations hint at the application of different standards for a selected group of states, and also imply the supremacy of internal "domestic" law-something that is again contrary to the rationale of the ECHR.
If one looks at Article 218(11) TFEU, on which the Opinion is based, the options are twofold. First, the EU may request re-negotiation of the Draft Accession Agreement. Second, it may change the Founding Treaties to accommodate the negotiated text. The latter option was considered, inter alia, by Besselink, who proposed to draft a "Notwithstanding Protocol."
111 According to Besselink the following text would be advisable: "'The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, notwithstanding Article 6(2) Treaty on European Union, Protocol (No 8) relating to Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union and Opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice of 18 December 2014." Although it is an interesting proposition, it is argued that modifying Article 6 TEU, in order to sideline the Court's Opinion, may not be the best step forward in cases like these. Especially when one takes into account the somewhat reduced appetite among the Member States for further Treaty revisions. All in all, this option, although intellectually sound and tempting, in reality may turn into a political fantasy.
A more limited modification would be to change Protocol No 8 as to allow for accession despite the Court's limited jurisdiction in relation to CFSP. One could argue that this should not meet any resistance on the side of the Member States because they already agreed that the Draft Accession Agreement was compatible with the ECHR. This would certainly not make the Court happy, but as Herren der Verträge, the Member States' wishes are in the end decisive. While it has been argued that the CFSP issue would be the most difficult issue to overcome, 112 the current political climate in Europe does not at all guarantee a speedy treaty modification. Also, it may be difficult to isolate this issue from other ones on the table.
The only way forward seems to be a return to the drawing board and to renegotiate the Draft Accession Agreement. 113 Judging by the experience thus far, it will be a rather tortuous exercise that is likely to take time. It will provide the Court of Justice a chance to continue building its line of case law based on the Charter of Fundamental Rights and, in the long run, minimize the direct impact of the Strasbourg Court on EU law. No doubt, opening the agreed text of the Draft Accession Agreement for further negotiation will not be welcomed by some the Member States, as well as by several non-EU parties to the ECHR. One need only be reminded of, for instance, the reaction by the Russian delegation when a number of EU Member States suggested to reopen negotiations because they could not live with an earlier draft:
Now, because of the internal problems of the EU, we have received amendments from our European Union colleagues. We are going to study them with great care. But the fact is these amendments reopen the agreed draft. Therefore, we will look at the EU proposals having in mind that we will also have the right to present our own amendments to the draft that was agreed by the CDDH Working Group, as well as to the documents circulated by the EU. We assume that our possible proposals will have the same status as the draft amendments proposed by the EU. We hope as well that future negotiations will really be negotiations between 47 individual member States and the 112 'Editorial Comments', 52 CMLRev. (2015), op.cit., n. 106, at 12. 113 Cf. also T. Lock, 'Oops! We did it again -the CJEU's Opinion on EU Accession to the ECHR', Verfassungsblog on Matters Constitutional, 18 December 2014; http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/oops-das-gutachten-des-eughzum-emrk-beitritt-der-eu/#.VK-e08bivs4.
European Commission and not between a 'European Union block' and those who are not members of the European Union.
114
One way out of this could be to use the possibility of reservations mentioned in Article 57 ECHR:
Any State may, when signing this Convention or when depositing its instrument of ratification, make a reservation in respect of any particular provision of the Convention to the extent that any law then in force in its territory is not in conformity with the provision. Reservations of a general character shall not be permitted under this Article.
It is particularly the latter sentence that may cause problems in this regard. While it may, for instance, be tempting to exclude CFSP from the ECtHR's jurisdiction, by including it in a reservation, this would be seen as too general of an exception. 115 For many Member States the opinion of the Court was not a welcome development. Though, for some Member States, in particular the UK, the opinion may have led to a sigh of relief. 116 At the same time, for the negotiators, particularly those from the European Commission, setting a new negotiation agenda will be the first challenge to be addressed. It goes without saying that finding a balanced compromise will inevitably pose certain difficulties. One key question remains: How to satisfy the Court's demands without undermining the raison d'être behind accession? In the end, this will not only be a question on the EU side, but also for the ECtHR, which will no doubt have thoughts on whether the amendments are still in line with the Convention. 117 
III. Charter of Fundamental Rights
One of the consequences of Opinion 2/13 is that for the foreseeable future the Charter of Fundamental Rights formally remains the EU's only bill of rights. Its presence is evident throughout the opinion, particularly in the general section that opens up the analysis proper. In a symbolic move the judges seem to have elevated the Charter in their discourse as if they were aiming to prove that the Court of Justice takes fundamental rights seriously, and that adequate guarantees are provided within the Charter as well as in general principles of EU law-as per Article 6 TEU. When the Charter entered into force on 1 December 2009 it was to a fair degree terra incognita. Back then, as D. Sarmiento puts it, "the prospects of a revolutionary impact in EU law were far from clear". 118 It is unquestionable that the Court of Justice has gone a long way from a mere en passant reference in Case C-555/07 Seda Kücükdeveci 119 to, what some may call, shooting from the hip as in Cases C-399/11 Melloni 120 and C-617/10 Fransson. 121 Undoubtedly, the Charter is now a persuasive source of rights that EU judicial institutions are ready to invoke. 122 It merits attention that a great majority of judgments dealing with the Charter are preliminary rulings submitted to the Court of Justice by domestic courts. The Charter has also been invoked in actions for annulment; 123 furthermore it has already served as a yardstick for review of legality under article 267 TFEU. 124 However, the European Commission has been quite reluctant to invoke the Charter in infraction proceedings based on Articles 258 and 260 TFEU. As argued by one of the present authors elsewhere, this trepidation is not accidental, but rather a well thought policy choice which takes into account the lack of clarity stemming from Article 51 which regulates the scope of application of the Charter. 125 It is yet to be seen how the clarification provided in the already mentioned case C-617/10 Fransson will make a difference in this respect.
Arguably, the coming years will allow the Court of Justice to explore the Charter and its potential even further. To venture into fortune telling would exceed the limits of this article, therefore we will limit ourselves to a few issues that are most likely to reach the Court of Justice. To start with, one should expect further clarification on the scope of application of the Charter. Article 51 makes it clear that it is binding on EU institutions, but on the Member States "only when they are implementing Union law." As already alluded to, the latter phrase is rather ambiguous and in case C-617/10 Fransson, the Court of Justice clarified it as follows:
Since the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter must […] be complied with where national legislation falls within the scope of European Union law, situations cannot exist which are covered in that way by European Union law without those fundamental rights being applicable. The applicability of European Union law entails applicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter.
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Although this conclusion was controversial and the application of the Charter to the case at hand went against the will of the Member States, it did send, together with message in case Melloni, an important signal to the legal community and EU citizens alike. The Court of Justice was willing to apply the Charter of Fundamental Rights extensively and to use its potential as primary law to the full extent. 127 Arguably, it seized the opportunity to start building a wall of case law based on the Charter before the European Union accedes to the ECHR. Looked at from this perspective, Opinion 2/13 is undoubtedly an important element in this jigsaw puzzle. As already mentioned, in the most recent jurisprudence, including Opinion 2/13, the Court of Justice returned to the notion of "implementing EU law". It is questionable if this is in reaction to the criticism that followed the ruling in Fransson, or perhaps the Court did not pay much attention to the matter in hand.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights still remains a bit of enigma when it comes to its enforcement in national courts. Although in Melloni, the Court of Justice extended the doctrine of primacy to the Charter. It is yet to be seen if other tenets of EU law are applicable, as well. This includes the well-established doctrines of direct and indirect effect 128 as well as state liability. 129 The Court of Justice is also likely to be asked to focus on the substance of rights guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The time gained by the rejection of the accession to the ECHR definitely increases the chances in this respect. One should note, although, that while some of those rights may reach the Court, some are very unlikely to do so. As far as the former are concerned, one should not be surprised to see future cases, particularly references for preliminary ruling dealing with the social rights regulated in the Charter. Furthermore, Article 47 of the Charter, which guarantees effective judicial protection, may reach the Luxembourg courtrooms. 130 For the latter, Article 45 of the Charter is a questionable provision the Court of Justice is going to be troubled with. Because the free movement of persons is thoroughly regulated in the TFEU and in EU secondary legislation, the value added by this provision is dubious, to say the least.
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D. Conclusion
Opinion 2/13 is without a shadow of the doubt one of the most important rulings of the Court of Justice, certainly not one of the evanescent ones. It has already triggered a heated debate and it is likely to continue to do so in the years to come. In simple terms, the judges in Luxembourg blocked the accession of the European Union to the ECHR at least for a number of years. They set their conditions out rather clearly but the question that remains is if such guarantees are negotiable to the Court's satisfaction. As argued in this article, to achieve a consensus with non-EU countries which are parties to the ECHR appears, at least prima facie, to be a potentially uphill struggle. For instance, the current political climate in EU relations with Russia or Turkey is not favorable by any stretch of imagination. Hence, to engage both countries in negotiations of nitty-gritty technicalities may not be the best idea. It boils down to a more general question of whether the demands made by the Court of Justice are a "ransom" worth paying for. Arguably, the caveats laid down by the drafters of the Treaty of Lisbon have been turned into locks, or, to put it differently, they are conditio sine qua non for future approval of the revised Accession Agreement.
The arguments made by the Court are so fundamental that one wonders if the negotiators saw it coming. Ensuring that the EU would be subject to external norms on fundamental rights was the whole purpose of joining the Strasbourg system, and it is inconceivable to think that only now that the Court seems to realize the impact. As we have seen, the Presidents of the two courts have issued joint statements; and they have no doubt addressed the issues during their regular (at least bi-annual) judicial dialogues. 132 Furthermore, a representative of the Court of Justice was present during the discussions on the negotiations, in the capacity of an observer. 133 At the same time the Registrar and Deputy Registrar of the ECHR participated in the negotiating group. 134 One may assume that most of the issues raised by the Court of Justice in its opinion have at some stage been part of the debates. Yet, it is indeed also a mater of interpretation. After all, not only the European Commission in presenting its views, but also the Advocate General Kokott, came to different conclusions on the basis of the same facts.
Against this background and given the interpretative margins, our conclusion is that the Court had a choice. Instead of turning to its natural risk-averse strategy, it could have started by trusting not only the Strasbourg system, the case law of which has already largely influenced EU law, but also the Member States, which by now have been trained to understand the nature of both EU law and the connected jurisdiction of the Court. Accepting an-indeed somewhat-subordinate role the Court could have sent a message that it has itself so often sent to its own Member States: Be willing to accept an interpretation of your domestic law in the light of overarching fundamental principles. 135 Except, in a way the Court held on to the view it presented in Opinion 1/91 (EEA) and Opinion 1/09 (European Patent Court). 136 It is not that the Court is not willing to submit itself to an external court, it simply does not allow that court to affect the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU to decide on internal disputes or to have the competence to interpret EU law.
Finally, will it make sense to try and "unlock" the situation? Arguably it does. 134 Ibid, at 318. 135 As argued by S. Peers: "the Court is seeking to protect the basic elements of EU law by disregarding the fundamental values upon which the Union was founded." See S. Peers, op. cit. n. 31. 136 See references in section A of this article. Irrespective of the further (and important) developments and use of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the accession of the EU to the ECHR will have a number of important implications. First, in the light of the continuing transfer of competences rights of individuals will be better guaranteed when the acts of the EU Institutions are subject to the same scrutiny as the acts of Member States' organs. Second, the current state of constitutional development of the EU legal order not only allows for, but perhaps even demands, external scrutiny. The EU should be self-confident enough to accept external checks and balances, and-more importantly-accept criticism in the case where things are not up to standards. Third, accession will contribute to more uniformity in the rights that are to be respected by all actors involved and will prevent the CJEU and the ECtHR to develop diverging interpretations on the same or similar provisions. Fourth, a continued protection of its own jurisdiction by the CJEU in this area may trigger domestic Constitutional Courts to do the same. 138 Finally, with further development of the Union's external action, fundamental rights are in need of protection when they are related to CFSP. 139 It is one thing to prevent judicial activism in that area; it is quite another thing to deliberately leave gaps in the protection of fundamental rights. 
